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BE1WEENTHEDOMESTICANDTHEFOREIGN:
CEN1ERING THE NATION'S EDGES
LEGAL
BORDERLANDS:
LAW
AND
THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS. Mary
L. Dudziak 1 and Leti Volpp/ eds. Johns Hopkins University
Press. 2006. Pp. viii+ 421. $19.95 (paper).
Linda Bosniak 3
"Every theory addresses some questions as its central
questions, and thereby makes other questions peripheral. "4
Contemporary American constitutional thought is largely
inward-looking. Most U.S. constitutional law scholarship "assumes the state," as Alex Aleinikoff recently noted, 5 and this
means, among other things, that constitutional discourse focuses
on relations among already-presumed members in an alreadyconstituted national space. The subjects and location of constitutionalism, the "we" and the "here," are presupposed and unproblematized.
The fact that they are reflects a longstanding habit of insular
thinking in the field. Constitutional scholarship's unwavering focus
has long been the national self. And as this approach is conventionally practiced, there is not much world beyond this self. The
American nation- with its myriad internal complexities and fascinations-is cast as the world entire.
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Although rarely acknowledged in explicit terms, this insularity-this self-absorption-reflects a dominant tradition in AngloAmerican normative political thought. Rawls' theory of justice
presupposed a conception of "a democratic society [that is] a complete and closed social system. " 6 In his early work, he aimed to
develop principles for "the basic structure of society conceived
for the time being as a closed system isolated from other socie7
ties. '' Much constitutional scholarship in recent decades has
treated the American nation as a kind of Rawlsian island.
Yet Rawls himself later recognized that the insularity premise
is ultimately implausable and limiting, 8 and it appears American
constitutional law scholarship is gradually coming to understand
this as well. Today, the fields of comparative constitutionalism,
foreign affairs and international law are growth areas-a trend
that reflects increasing awareness that our constitutional community is one among many others rather than a universe unto
itself. Some constitutional scholars are also beginning to place
globalization of economic and social life on the intellectual
agenda, recognizing the need to understand the national self as
located in a broader transnational field. Getting beyond insularity, no doubt, will take time. Not infrequently, the world beyond
the national self elicits more lip service than analytic integration.
Still, there is little doubt that the comparative, the international,
the global, are pressing in. The constitutional community's location in a broader world, and the fact of its imbrications with outside others, are increasingly shaping constitutional thought-as
they must if it is to be of real theoretical and practical value in
coming decades.
On the other hand, the problem of perspectival insularity
cannot be remedied simply by recognizing the nation's global situatedness and its relations with legal actors and regimes beyond
our own. It is not enough, that is, to supplement inward-looking
constitutionalism by ensuring more air time for outwardoriented approaches- by adding more courses and conferences
and SSRN websites on the global and diplomatic and comparative dimensions of constitutional studies. Although essential, this
supplementation strategy only takes us part of the way. What it
entails, in effect, is the posting of additional sentries at the fron-

6. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LiBERALISM 40 (1993).
7. JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8 (1971).
8. See JoH:-; RAWLS. THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999). in which Rawls turns his attention to relationships among political communities.
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tier between the domestic and the foreign, with the new enlistees
aiming outward rather than inward.
The problem with this image is that it presumes the existence of a firm divide between national-self and outside-other,
between the domestic and the foreign, that doesn't hold up.
Certainly, some issues fall neatly on one side of the line or the
other, thus justifying a division of labor between inward and
outward-looking constitutionalism. But it is also true that the
national self and its others converge in a multiplicity of moments
and manners and locations, and these convergences complicate
the presumed divide between the in-here and the out-there. The
domestic and the foreign often run up against each other. Whether
formally or informally, violently or uneventfully, they interact;
they mutually engage.
Notably, those occasions and locations of interaction between the domestic and the foreign are themselves neither entirely domestic nor entirely foreign; they are interstitial spaces,
characterized by what anthropologists call liminality. 9 Whether
arising at the nation's geographic frontiers or its figurative ones,
they require their own attention as an analytical matter.
And, indeed, attention is now being paid in many disciplines,
via the subfield of "border studies." 10 The consistent analytical
premise of border studies is that the boundaries between the
domestic and the foreign themselves constitute a sphere or set of
spheres with their own distinct set of dynamics, their own ecologies, which require their own scholarly focus.
Purely for empirical reasons, then, making sense of the contemporary legal and political and social landscape requires attending not just to the national inside and the national outside,
but to those domains of interaction at the border between them.
Yet once again the significance of attending to these liminal
spaces and moments is more than additive. The border between
the domestic and the foreign is not merely a "third space" which
demands attention in its own right 11 -although it does. A focus
on national boundaries makes clear, additionally, that there are
really no unalloyed domestic and foreign spaces after all. The
nation's inside and its outside are always interpenetrated, always
9. See generally VICTOR TURNER, BetwiXI and Between: The Liminal Period in
Rites de Passage, in THE FOREST OF SYMBOLS: ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RITUAL (1967).
10. Partly because it is interdisciplinary. the literature is vast. For one synthetic.
introductory treatment with a focus on the social sciences, see Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly.
Theorizing Borders: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. 10(4) GEOPOLITICS, 633-49 (2005).
II. See generally HOM! BHABBHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (1994).
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marbled through with one another. Border studies anatomize
these domains of interface; and in the process, allow us to see
how the domestic and the foreign are constantly making and remaking one another.
One implication is that attending to the nation's edges,
wherever those are located, is of essential importance even for
those whose primary interest remains inward-looking, domestic
constitutionallaw. 12 For it turns out that the constitutional inside
is comprised not merely by matters of "ruling and being ruled"
and other issues conventionally understood to lie at the heart of
the field, 13 but by all of the rules and practices that govern the
scope -personal and territorial-of the community within which
people are ruling and being ruled. Policies and practices regarding immigration and citizenship status, extraterritorial jurisdiction, military occupation, management of territorial possessions,
assignment of enemy combatant status in war, rights of noncitizens,
status of refugees and escapees-all of these infuse and give
shape to the presumptive "who" and "where" which serve as
backdrop to many of the questions that are conventionally considered to lie at the core of constitutional inquiry.
This excellent volume of essays directs its gaze precisely at
the domains of interaction between the foreign and the domestic
in the context of the American nation-state. Originally published
as a special issue of the American Quarterly, it is a collection of
articles by scholars in law, literature and history who are devoted
to making sense of the United States by way of its legally constructed edges. Sometimes these edges are located at the nation's
geographic frontier, but just as often they can be found on the
other side of the world or in very heart of the nation's territory.
And it is often in, and through, the bodies and minds of personswhether they happen to be territorially inside or not- that these
edges are most consequential. As the collection's editors Mary
Dudziak and Leti Volpp write in their introduction, the volume's
essays address not only "spaces on the edge of American sovereignty," but also "internal places at the heart of American identity" (p. 2). These are the legal "borderlands" of the volume's title.
Dudziak, a legal historian, and Volpp, a culturally-minded
legal scholar, have drawn together a set of essays that produc-

12. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:
CASES AND MATERIALSch. 4, §II (5th ed. 2006}.

13. Cf T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Sovereignty Swdies in Constitutional Law: A
Comment, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 197 (2000).
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tively transverse traditional disciplinary boundaries. The literary
and historical chapters are legally grounded, while the legal
chapters are richly historical and culturally-informed. Reading
them reminds us how and why interdisciplinarity can be so rewarding. The interdisciplinarity works well here because, for the
most part, the diverse approaches are linked by common substantive questions about America's national edges, as refracted
through issues of identity, responsibility, power and membership.
Thus, there are essays on wartime internment, on immigration
and naturalization policy, on military occupation, on extraterritorial jurisdiction, on sovereignty, on statelessness and on
nativism.
Not surprisingly given the essays' range, the framing idea of
"borderland" here can sometimes seem overworked. In an early
chapter in the volume, Austin Sarat writes of the "uncertain
boundaries of the rule of law itself" (p. 34 ). Here, the idea of
borderlands is used purely metaphorically, to reference questions about the scope of law and legal concepts. 14 Elsewhere in
the volume, the idea of "border" is employed to refer to generic
issues of "internal" inclusion and exclusion, via the concepts of
"sexual borderlands" and "racial borderlands." These uses of the
term, while perhaps valuable in other contexts, distract in the context of this particular volume. The intellectual significance of this
collection of essays, it seems to me, lies in its focus on national
borders and on the borders of the American nation state, in particular. These are borders that constitute America not merely as
a society but as a national polity located in the wider world. When
the terms "borders" and "borderlands" are used without specific
reference to national bordering, they can appear jargonish, and
their use serves to undercut the analytical contribution the volume
otherwise makes.
That is not to say that the study of "internal" forms of status
exclusion, like racism, are beyond the proper scope of this volume.
On the contrary, race has to figure centrally in any study of the
construction of the nation. And this volume contributes significantly to analyzing the tangled linkages between nation and race.
Some of the most powerful chapters in the book specifically conjoin a study of classically internal forms of status exclusions, like
those associated with race, with construction of national borders
14. Austin Sarat. At the Boundaries of Law: Exewtive Clemency, Sovereign Prerogative, and the Dilemma of American Legality (pp. 19-39). Sarat writes: ''[T]he rule of law is
replete with gaps. fissures and failures. places where law runs up against national interest of
sovereign prerogative. Its boundaries are unclear. uncertain. unchartable" (p. 34).
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and the national domestic/foreign divide. For example, in a
chapter entitled "Racial Naturalization," legal scholar Devon
Carbado powerfully characterizes his experience of induction into
American national membership as a young black immigrant. In a
pair of encounters with the LA police department-one while
driving, the other in an erroneous apartment search- he and his
brothers sought to invoke their "foreignness" to exempt themselves from assigned inclusion in the category of American black
criminality, but to little avail. Although the police officers involved
found themselves confused by the British accents and the lack of
submissive "racial etiquette," they ultimately imbued the young
men with black American identity through imposition of demeaning racialized law enforcement rituals. In this respect the brothers
were "naturalized," not in the "formal and doctrinal" sense
(p. 45), but in a metaphoric sense: "our race had naturalized us"
into American national identity (p. 44 ). Their inclusion in the
nation precisely entailed, and was marked by, racial subordination.15
In reflecting upon these experiences, Carbado proposes a
way of thinking about the relationship between equality and belonging, between "the color line" and the territorial border-line,
that is analytically useful. The matrices of equality/inequality
and inclusion/inclusion are related paradoxically, he argues: "To
racially belong to America as a nonwhite is to experience racial
inequality"- that is, to experience exclusion (p. 47). In this regard, racism not only divides us as Americans; it also binds us as a
nation in a multiracial hierarchy, via a longstanding regime of "inclusive exclusion" (p. 60). Here, the theoretical linkage explored
between "internal border" and national border advances our
study of the modalities of American otherness.
If, moreover, some of the metaphorical uses of the border
concept threaten to thin it out too much, an insistence on a narrower, literal usage is no antidote. The volume's contribution
derives precisely from its spacious interpretation of the national

15. This is an argument made by Toni Morrison in a well-known essay some years
ago. Morrison wrote that the "most enduring and efficient rite of passage into American
culture [is] negative appraisals of the native-born black population. Only when the lesson
of racial estrangement is learned is assimilation complete." Toni Morrison, On the Backs
uf Blacks, in ARGUING IMMIGRATION: THE DEBATE OVER THE CHANGING FACE OF
AMERICA 97 (Nicolaus Mills ed .. Touchstone 1994). In response, Carbado writes, "Morrison's analysis might lead one to conclude that the episode she describes figures [the
Greek immigrants'] but not the shoe shiner's Americanization. My own view, however, is
that the encounter naturalizes the shoe shiner as well. More than merely reflect the shoe
shiner's black American identity, the encounter actually produces it." (p. 60).
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border concept. As a group, these essays make clear that national
borders are not merely physical frontiers at the edges of nationstate territory. Borders are legal regimes within states that work
to police membership, and they are sites of power claimed by
states that operate in physical spaces far afield from the nation's
geographic "home." Borders defend but they also contain; they
divide but they also join. National borders have both instrumental
and expressive content. The collection as a whole captures all of
these facets, making its broad usage of the "border" concept
valuable overall.
A number of these essays are especially relevant to American constitutional thought today. Christina Burnett's chapter,
The Edges of Empire and the Limits of Sovereignty: American
Guano Islands (pp. 187-211), serves as an instructive counterpoint to the fast-growing literature on the constitutional status of
unincorporated territories. 16 Unlike Puerto Rico, a territory cast
in the Insular Cases as "foreign in a domestic sense," Palmyra
(one of the Guano Islands) "is the only 'incorporated' territory
of the United States." (p. 187). In the course of recounting how a
series of tiny islets in the South Pacific (graced with a copious reserve of dried bird droppings considered valuable as fertilizer),
came to possess such a unique and comparatively privileged
status, Burnett provides a rich legal history of American extraterritorial expansion in the 19th century. In the course of the
analysis, she highlights the key legal distinction between territories deemed to belong to, without being a part of, the United States
(e.g., Puerto Rico) and those which are indeed considered a part
of the United States such that the Constitution "follows the flag"
there. As the Guano Islands highlight, the distinction is difficult
to justify in formal and practical terms, yet it is highly consequential. For if Palmyra had any inhabitants to speak of, they
would be entitled to full constitutional protections against
American power, as the millions of residents of Puerto Ricodeemed "foreign ... in a domestic sense" 17 - are not. 18
16. This is a literature Burnett herself has importantly helped to nurture and to which
she has contributed. See FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAr-<
EXPANSION. AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Burnett and Burke Marshall, eds. 2001).
17. Downes v. Bidwell, 1112 U.S. 244,341-42 (1901) (White, J., concurring). Christina
Burnett co-edited an important collection of essays on the constitutional status of Puerto
Rico in 2001. See Burnett & Marshall, supra note lli.
18. Per the Insular cases. ··nonfundamental" constitutional rights and limitations do
not apply in Puerto Rico or other incorporated territories. but truly "fundamental" rights
and limitations (whatever these are. exactly) do. For discussion, see Gerald L. Neuman.
Constitutionalism and Individual Rights in the Territories. in Burnett & Marshall. supra
note lli, at 1112-2011.
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But of course, if Palmyra is not Puerto Rico, neither is it a
state of the union; it is some kind of intermediate, hybrid creature.
Burnett reads this hybridity, and its relation to the distinct hybridity
of the unincorporated territories, by reference to sovereignty and
its manipulations. She makes clear that the history of American
imperialism is as much about the disclaiming as the assertion of
sovereignty. Sovereignty carries burdens as well as benefits, she
writes; and "[t]he practice of imperialism ... has relied on the
creation of legal categories that do their work by withholding,
retracting, and assiduously delimiting national power, as well as
by increasing and extending it" (p. 208) precisely in order to avoid
obligations conventionally regarded as appurtenant to rule.
Efforts by the United State to assert control while disclaiming
sovereignty, of course, have notoriously framed recent debates
over the nation's detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay. Amy
Kaplan's essay, entitled Where Is Guantanamo? (pp. 239-66),
examines the ways in which the United States has sought to construct and exploit the disjuncture between control and responsibility in Guantanamo Bay. Guantanamo is a hybrid in its own
distinct way- "an animal" with "no other like it" -in Justice
Ginsburg's words 19 -where coercive state power is deployed not
merely beyond the formal territory of the state but "outside the
rule of law" itself (p. 240). The Supreme Court in Rasul did repudiate government efforts to maintain Guantanamo as a space
outside "the rule of domestic law" (p. 241 ). Yet the prison persists
as a "legal black hole" (p. 239). And the best the Rasul majority
could muster in any event was the argument that Guantanamo
should be read in light of the Insular Cases, thus placing it "in an
indefinite legal borderland between the domestic and the foreign"
(p. 255)- hardly a mortal blow, she points out, against empire.
Much of this chapter narrates what Kaplan calls the "long
imperial history" of the U.S. in Guantanamo (pp. 242-45). At
one time, Guantanamo served a way-station in the African slave
trade, and in the trade of sugar and molasses produced by slave
labor. The U.S. gained control in 1903 in the wake of the Spanish
American War pursuant to a lease agreement signed with
Cuba-one which effectively forced Cuba "to cede sovereignty
over part of the territory it never controlled" (p. 244). Thereafter, Guantanamo served as a "coaling station, a naval base, a
19. Quoted at (p. 239). At oral argument in the Ra1·u/ case, Justice Ginsburg stated, "I think
Guantanamo. everyone agrees, is an animal. there is no other like it." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Oral Arguments. Rasu/ v. Bu.1h, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). Transcript of Oral Argument are available at
httpJ/www .supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-334.pdf.
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cold war outpost and a detention center for unwanted refugees"
(p. 240) before it became a notorious prison camp. Meanwhile,
since the mid-20th century, the residential portions of the base have
been portrayed as a kind of transplanted small-town America, and
even today, with its "bowling alleys, video rental shops, golf courses
and McDonald's restaurants" (p. 246), it is still described by
military personnel as "Mayberry RFD with bad neighbors"(p.
246) 20 (although, as Kaplan notes, it is unclear whether the bad
neighbors referred to are "the Cubans kept out by barbed wire
fences and military guards or the prisoners encaged by barbed
wire inside the base" (p. 246).)
Kaplan's point in providing this context is to situate the debates over Guantanamo in a larger social and political field than
the usual legal accounts provide. Kaplan makes two arguments:
First, Guantanamo needs to be read as part of a larger history of
American imperialism. Most legal discussions of the prison camp
there focus on matters of human rights, national security, extraterritorial jurisdiction and the scope of international law. While
these elements are obviously crucial, "the legal space of Guantanamo today has been shaped and remains haunted by its imRerial
history" (p. 241) and needs to be understood in these terms. 1 Her
account-which includes detailed and perceptive readings of the
Rasul and Hamdan decisions-impels us to reflect on how it has
come to pass that this tiny slice of island, so close and yet so far
from the United States, "occupies a transitional political space,
where a prison housed in a communist nation against whom the
U.S. is still fighting the cold war has become an epi-center for the
new 'war on terror'" (pp. 239-40), and also about how it has come
to serve as both prototype and shorthand for other instances of
20. For this quote, Kaplan cites Matthew Hay Brown, Cuban Base Has American
Flavor. MORNING CALL ONLINE. Jan. 2. 2004 (p. 264 n.30). Kaplan continues: "With unintended irony. a defense department publication elaborated on the meaning of "Mayberry," the town in television's Andy Griffith Show of the 1960's. 'Like Mayberry,
Guantanamo Bay has virtually no crime"' (p. 246-47), citing Kathleen T. Rhem. From
Mayberry to Metropolis: Guantdnamo Bay Changes. AMERICAN FORCES PRESS
SERVICE. Mar. 3. 2005.
21. Kaplan writes: "Until recently. the notion of American imperialism was considered a contradiction in terms. an accusation hurled only by left-wing critics. Indeed the
denial of imperialism still fuels a vision of America as an exceptional nation, one interested in spreading universal values, not in conquest and domination. Yet, since September
11. 2001. neoconservative and liberal interventionists have openly embraced the vision of
an ascendant American Empire policing and transforming the world around it through
military and political might and economic and cultural power. Other commentators of
different political perspectives have viewed the United States as an overstretched empire
in chaotic decline ... (However, t]he question of empire has rarely entered the important
legal debates about ... Guantanamo as a legal dilemma" (pp. 240-41).
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unbridled incarcerative power (by way of what Michelle Brown,
another of the volume's contributors, calls "The Prison Nation
Abroad" (p. 381)).
Second, Kaplan powerfully reminds us that the naval base at
Guantanamo has served a range of imperial functions over the
years: "[F]rom a way-station for the global reach of military
might outward, it became a site of detention camps for blocking
Haitian and Cuban refugees from entering the United States."
(p. 247). One portion of the camp was newly constructed in the
1980's to house HIV -infected Haitians during a period of raceinflected hysteria over mass contagion. These anxieties extend to
the current prisoners who "continue to inhabit the racialized
images ... of shackled slaves, infected bodies, revolutionary subjects, and undesirable immigrants" (p. 248).
Overall, this chapter brings legal studies together with
American Studies in a particularly effective way. Its sometimesdevastating cultural reading of "Guantanamo as a legal dilemma"
(p. 241) represents interdisciplinarity at its best.
Another fascinating chapter of constitutional interest turns
its sights back to the national interior and explores the complex
interface between race and immigration politics here, this time in
an historical context. Moon-Ho Jung's chapter, "Outlawing
'Coolies': Race, Nation and Empire in the Age of Emancipation" (pp. 85-109), examines the interplay between anti-slavery
and racist logics in the debate over Chinese contract laborers who
entered the United States en masse in the post-Civil War era.
Jung shows, first, how the Chinese contract labor system exploded
after emancipation in response to escalating labor demands and,
in turn, how opposition to the "coolie" labor system served to
justify opposition to Chinese immigration more broadly, and
eventually made possible "the passage of the nation's first restrictions on immigration under the banner of 'freedom'" (p. 87).
Anti-slavery arguments, in short, subserved anti-Chinese policy.
In the process, the chapter shows how demarcating "the legal
boundary between slavery and freedom" (p. 86), between migrant
labor importation and immigration, is difficult (a point we have
yet again seen underlined by recent debates in the U.S. over
proposed guest-worker programs). Jung asks, "[ d]id the recruitment and employment of 'coolies' represent a relic of slavery or
a harbinger of freedom?" (p. 88). That question was answered
differently by different parties at different moments; the "coolie"
labor regime was, at times, regarded (both by pro-slavery and
abolitionist forces) as tantamount to, or even more exploitative
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than, slavery; at others, as a means of effectuating slave emancipation and as an exemplar of "free" labor. But whatever the verdict,
Jung shows how the Chinese coolies and African slaves or former
slaves-'"the Chinaman and the Negro"' (p. 91)-were each
employed to construct the other as racial inferiors and, simultaneously, to produce an image of the "immigrant" to America
as a white European.
Meanwhile, the story of the coolie trade and the opposition
it engendered is part of the story of nineteenth century United
States imperial expansion in the Caribbean and Asia. After
British emancipation, Chinese labor became essential as replacement labor on Caribbean plantations. In response, the antibellum U.S. government deployed anti-slavery and free trade
rhetoric as justification for more aggressive regional interventions aimed at "deliverance of slaves and 'coolies' from backward despots" (p. 101). This history is recounted by Jung in chewy
detail. Overall, the chapter's portrait of Chinese Exclusion as a
site where slavery and emancipation, labor relations, racial stratification, immigration policy and national expansionism all intersect highlights the power and the the necessity of engaging in
scholarly inquiry at the border.
There are several other chapters in the Borderlands volume
which will be of interest to many constitutional scholars. These
include Teemu Ruskola's essay on the 19th century regime of
American extraterritorial jurisdiction in Canton (an instance of
what Ruskola calls "nonterritorial imperialism" (p. 267-92, 283)),
Lisa Yoneyama's essay on Japanese women's enfranchisement
under American military occupation after World War II (pp. 293318), Susan L. Carruther's treatment of Eastern Bloc "escapees"
during the Cold War (pp. 319-50), Linda Kerber's account of the
development of the institution of statelessness in the U.S. (pp.
135-57), and Michelle Brown's chapter on Abu Ghraib and the
"Prison Nation Abroad." All of these present perceptive treatments of the borders, physical and symbolic, that divide the
domestic from the foreign (pp. 381-405). 22
22. Other chapters include an entertaining piece on Oil, Empire and the Sport Utility Vehicle. sec David Campbell. The Biopolitics of Sewrtiy: Oil, Empire and the Sports
Utility Vehicle (pp. 351-110). and the following chapters: Siobhan B. Somerville. Notes
Toward a Queer Hiswry of Naturalization (pp. 67-113); Nayan Shah, Between "Oriefllal
Depravity" and "Natural Degenerates": Spatial Borderlands and the Making of Ordinary
Americans (pp. 111-33); Maria Josefina Saldana-Portillo. In the Shadow of NAFTA: Y
Tu Mama Tamhien Revisits the National Allegory of Mexican Sovereigflly (pp. 159-115);
Andrew Hebard. Romamic Sovereignty: Popular Romances and the American Imperial
Swte in the Phillippines (pp. 213-311). and an introductory essay. Austin Sara!, At the
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In sum, this volume of interdisciplinary essays on the legal
construction of national borders has much to offer constitutional
scholars. Yet it is worth considering the question of how, exactly,
it can be useful. We clearly all benefit from reading across fields
and reading interdisciplinarily, but what is this material's relevance to the field of constitutional studies specifically? Does
constitutional law simply regard the border literature produced
in other areas of law and in neighboring disciplines as pools
which are edifying to dip into from time to time, but which are
ultimately tangential to its standard research program? Or must
national edges be brought into the center of the field itself?
Aleinikoff has argued that constitutional law scholarship needs
to widen its gaze to address questions of the American nationstate's "borders, its members and its powers. " 23 I entirely agree,
as I have made clear. So far, these issues have remained largely
off the main stage-as preconditional but unremarked frameworks rather than the central event. That is not to say the issues are
unexplored: there is, in fact, a great deal of powerful work going on
in constitutional studies on "legal spatiality," 24 territoriality, assertions and denials of sovereignty, scope of jurisdiction, citizenship
and immigration. Recent events associated with the "war on
terror" have clearly accelerated the pace of production on these
themes. 25 Still, in many respects, studies of the divide between
America's foreign and domestic spheres continue to languish in
"the backwaters of constitutional law. " 26
To make America's edges a central preoccupation of American constitutional law would be to self-consciously develop a

Boundaries of Law: Executive Clemency. Sovereign Prerogative, and the Dilemma of
American Legality (pp. 19-39).
23. ALEINIKOFF. supra note 5, at 11.
24. Kal Raustiala, The Geography of.l!wice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 (2005)
25. E.g, David Cole, ENEMY ALIENS (New Press, 2003); Neal Katyal, Equality in the
War on Terror. 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (2007); Natsu Taylor Saito, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION
TOGUANTANAMO BAY: PLENARY POWER AND THE PREROGATIVESTATE(2<XJ7).
26. ALEINIKOFF. supra note 5, at 1H3. Other scholars have urged that questions
concerning the scope of the nation's membership and territory be treated as central to
the field. See especially the symposium issue of Constitutional Commentary on The Can·
ons of Constitutional Law, esp. Sanford Levinson. Why The Canon Should Be Expanded
To Include the Insular Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism. 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 241 (2000); Mark Tushnet. The Canons of Constitutional Law. An lntroduc·
cion, 17 CONST. CoMMENT. 1H7 (2000). See also Aleinikoff's contribution to the same
symposium issue. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Sovereignty Studies in Constitutional Law: A
Comment, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 197 (2000). Several years earlier. Gerald Neuman urged
constitutional scholars to attend to themes of national membership and the scope of national territory and jursidiction. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996).
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subfield of national boundary studies. Aleinikoff proposes "sovereignty studies" to name the field (or a similar one), but I don't
find that framing compelling. Sovereignty, it seems to me, is one
among many of the substantive themes this field must investigate,
along with membership, territoriality, spatiality, citizenship, and
jurisdiction, rather than an umbrella concept that contains them
all. Indeed the idea of sovereignty seems to reference only part
of what is at stake here: the term is conventionally linked with
governance and power (and perhaps, by implication, its absence),
but not with structural and experiential issues of national membership, solidarity, identity, and lack thereof. 27 Further, the term
"sovereignty" seems to me to be loaded with too many assumptions about the nature of political community for the job. 28 Sovereignty's nearly inextricable association with the nation-statethe fact that we tend to treat the nation-state as the natural and
inevitable locus of sovereignty- makes it hard to treat the national
state as a central object of analysis in such a field. The idea of
"sovereignty studies," in other words, seems to presuppose a
substantial part of what we want to investigate. 29
We are better off with a concept that names not a substantive
quantity but a domain of inquiry. Arguably, the idea of "boundaries" does this. To speak of boundaries is not necessarily to
speak of a physical domain; boundaries are often inanimate. On
the other hand, the object of inquiry would not be conceptual
boundaries, or the "the boundaries of legality" generally (p. 34)
since, after all, much of legal studies could be described as the
investigation of where and when some rules or standards give
out and others begin. The focus, instead, would be the territorial

27. For a thoughtful recent reflection on the concept of sovereignty. See James
Sheehan. Presidential Address: The Prvhlem of Sovereignty in European History. 111
AM. HIST. REV. 1. 2 (2006):
Sovereignty is obviously a political concept. but unlike political concepts such as
democracy or monarchy. it is not about the location of power (the sovereign.
Hobbes wrote. can be ''the one or the many"): unlike parliament or bureaucracy. it does not describe institutions that exercise power: and unlike order or
justice. it does not define the purposes of power. The concept of sovereignty has
to do with the relationship of political power to other forms of authority.
Sovereignty is best understood as a set of claims made by those seeking or
wielding power. claims about the superiority and autonomy of their authority.
28. For a useful commentary on the nationalist presumptions of the sovereignty
concept. see R.B.J. Walker. Sovereignty. Identity. Community: Reflections on the Horizons
of Contemporary Politir.:al Practir.:e, in CmHENDING SOVEREIGNTIES: REDEFINI:--JG
POLITICAL COMMUNITY 159--85 (R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz. eds .. Lynne Rienner
Publishers. 1990).
29. Given Aleinikoff's own preoccupations with "sovereignty and membership.''
"sovereignty studies" does not quite seem to capture what he is after in any event.
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and jurisdictional boundaries of the American nation, as mediated
through constitutional law. Studying national boundaries means
studying the ongoing construction and reconstruction of the context within which the Constitution is deemed, or claimed to be,
operative. It means attending to the endlessly contested geographic and personal domain of all those rights and powers that
are conventionally considered the real subject of constitutional
law. It means making the frame part of the story.
To argue that the nation's boundaries ought to be made a
central object of constitutional focus, I should add, is not necessarily to express a normative view about those boundaries. It is
true that in many fields, border studies tend to be critical in
orientation; and virtually all of the Borderlands chapters draw
on, and articulate, critical approaches in their various disciplines.
Yet my point here in urging more attention to the nation's edges
is predominantly methodological in nature: the problem is not so
much that national boundaries and their enforcement are bad as
that they are ignored.
On the other hand, the methodological probably cannot ultimately be severed from the normative in this endeavor. After
all, questions will more often be ignored when they relate to
phenomena taken to be natural and unproblematic; and conversely, the very process of disregard tends to reinforce the perception of their naturalness and unproblematic quality. In this
regard, simply placing these questions on the table can be viewed
as a critical act, an act of "denaturalizing" aspects of the world
heretofore taken-for-granted.
It is also true that questions about national boundaries inevitably implicate themes of exclusion and domination, about
which some normative engagement is inevitable. And since exclusion and domination within the nation are themes that lie at
the heart of the constitutional law field, making national boundaries a central concern of the field will require us to think about
how well, and to what extent, the field's standard normative
frameworks translate from the nation's center to its edges.
In sum, for those constitutional law scholars interested in
making American edges more central to the field, the essays in
the Borderlands volume provide an excellent accompaniment.
Through imaginative readings of historical and contemporary legal materials, they help us to think about who is in and who is
out, where is here and where is there-in short, about what is
domestic and what is foreign in a national sense.

